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ABSTRACT
Real-world graph applications, such as advertisements and prod-
uct recommendations make prots based on accurately classify
the label of the nodes. However, in such scenarios, there are high
incentives for the adversaries to aack such graph to reduce the
node classication performance. Previous work on graph adversar-
ial aacks focus on modifying existing graph structures, which is
infeasible in most real-world applications. In contrast, it is more
practical to inject adversarial nodes into existing graphs, which can
also potentially reduce the performance of the classier.
In this paper, we study the novel node injection poisoning aacks
problem which aims to poison the graph. We describe a reinforce-
ment learning based method, namely NIPA, to sequentially modify
the adversarial information of the injected nodes. We report the
results of experiments using several benchmark data sets that show
the superior performance of the proposed method NIPA, relative to
the existing state-of-the-art methods.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Graphs, in which nodes and their aributes denote real-world enti-
ties (e.g., individuals) and links encode dierent types of relation-
ships (e.g., friendship) between entities, are ubiquitous in many
domains, such as social networks, electronic commerce, politics,
counter-terrorism, among others. Many real-world applications
e.g., targeting advertisements and product recommendations, rely
on accurate methods for node classication [1, 4]. However, in
high-stakes scenarios, such as political campaigns and e-commerce,
there are signicant political, nancial, or other incentives for ad-
versaries to aack such graphs to achieve their goals. For example,
political adversaries may want to propagate fake news in social me-
dias to damage an opponent’s electoral prospects [2]. e success
of such aack depends on a large extent of the adversaries’ ability
to misclassify the graph classier.
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(b)(a) (c)
dummy attacker smart attackerclean graph
Figure 1: (a) is the toy graph where the color of a node repre-
sents its label; (b) shows the poisoning injection attack per-
formed by a dummy attacker; (c) shows the poisoning in-
jection attack performed by a smart attacker. e injected
nodes are circled with dashed line.
Recent works [12, 32, 35] have shown that even the state-of-the-
art graph classiers are susceptible to aacks which aim at adversely
impacting the node classication accuracy. Because graph classi-
ers are trained based on node aributes and the link structure in
the graph, an adversary can aack the classier by poisoning the
graph data used for training the classier. Such an aack can be
(i) node specic, as in the case of a target evasion aack [32, 35]
that is designed to ensure that the node classier is fooled into
misclassifying a specic node; or (ii) non-target [12], as in the case
of aacks that aim to reduce the accuracy of node classication
across a graph. As shown by [12, 32, 35], both node specic and
non-target aacks can be executed by selectively adding fake (ad-
versarial) edges or selectively remove (genuine) edges between the
existing nodes in the graph so as to adversely impact the accuracy
of the resulting graph classiers. However, the success of such
aack strategy requires that the adversary is able to manipulate the
connectivity between the nodes in the graph, e.g., Facebook, which
requires breaching the security of the requisite subset of members
(so as to modify their connectivity), or breaching the security of
the database that stores the graph data, or manipulating the requi-
site members into adding or deleting their links to other selected
members. Consequently, such aack strategy is expensive for the
adversary to execute without being caught.
In this paper, we introduce a novel graph non-target aack aimed
at adversely impacting the accuracy of graph classier. We describe
a node injection poisoning aack procedure that provides an ef-
fective way to aack a graph by introducing fake nodes with fake
labels that link to genuine nodes so as to poison the graph data.
Unlike previously studied graph aacks, the proposed strategy en-
ables an aacker to boost the node misclassication rate without
changing the link structure between the existing nodes in the graph.
For example, in Facebook network, an aacker could simply cre-
ates fake member proles and manipulate real members to link to
the fake member proles, so as to change the predicted labels of
some of the real Facebook members. Such aack is easier and less
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expensive to execute compared to those that require manipulating
the links between genuine nodes in the graph.
Establishing links between an injected adversarial (fake) node to
existing nodes in the original graph or to other injected adversarial
nodes is a non-trivial task. As shown in Figure 1, both the aackers
in (b) and (c) want to inject two fake nodes into the clean graph in
(a). However, it is obviously presented in Figure 1 that the ”smart
aacker” who carefully designs the links and label of the injected
nodes could beer poison the graph than the ”dummy aack” who
generates the links and labels at random. We also observe that such
task is naturally formulated as a Markov decision process (MDP) and
reinforcement learning algorithms, e.g., Q-learning [30] oers a
natural framework for solving such problems [9, 27, 31]. However,
a representation that directly encodes graph structure as states and
addition and deletion of links leads to an intractable MDP. Hence,
we adopt a hierarchical Q-learning network (HQN) to learn and
exploit a compact yet accurate encoding of the Q function to manip-
ulate the labels of adversarial nodes as well as their connectivity to
other nodes. We propose a framework named NIPA to execute the
Node Injection Poisoning Aack. Training the NIPA presents some
non-trivial challenges: (i) NIPA has to sequentially guide fake nodes
to introduce fake links to other (fake or genuine) nodes and then
adversarially manipulate the labels of fake nodes; (ii) e reward
function needs to be carefully designed to steer the NIPA to execute
eective NIA.
e key contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We study the novel non-target graph node injection aack
problem to adversely impact the accuracy of a node classi-
er without manipulating the link structure of the original
graph.
• We propose a new framework NIPA, a hierarchical Q-
learning based method that can be executed by an adver-
sary to eectively perform the poisoning aack. NIPA
successfully addresses several non-trivial challenges pre-
sented by the resulting reinforcement learning problem.
• We present results of experiments with several real-world
graphs data that show that NIPA outperforms the state-of-
the-art non-target aacks on graph.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the related work. Section 3 formally denes the non-target node
injection poisoning aack problem. Section 4 gives the details
of the proposed NIPA. Section 5 shows empirical evaluation with
discussion and section 6 presents the conclusion and future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our study falls in the general area of data poisoning aack [6],
which aims at aack the model by corrupting the training data. Data
poisoning aacks have been extensively studied for the non graph-
structured data, including supervised learning [5, 20, 23], unsuper-
vised feature selection [33], and reinforcement learning [16, 18, 21]
etc. However, lile aention has been given to understanding how
to poison the graph structured data.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks on Graphs
e previous works [17, 28] have shown the intriguing properties
of neural networks as they are ”vulnerable to adversarial examples”
in computer vision domain. For example, in [17], the authors show
that some deep models are not resistant to adversarial perturbation
and propose the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to generate
the adversarial image samples to aack such models. Not only
in computer vision domain, recently such ”intriguing properties”
have also been observed in the graph mining domain. e research
communities show that graph neural networks are also vulnerable
to adversarial aacks. Neack [35] is one of the rst methods that
perturbs the graph data to perform poisoning/training-time aack
on GCN [19] model. RL-S2V [12] adopts reinforcement learning for
evasion/testing-time aack on graph data. Dierent from previous
methods, [10] and [32] focus on poison aack by gradient infor-
mation. [10] aacks the graph in embedding space by iteratively
modifying the connections of nodes with maximum absolute gradi-
ent. [32] proposes to aack the graph structured data by use the
integrated gradients approximating the gradients computed by the
model and performs perturbation on data by ipping the binary
value. [36] modies the training data and performs poisoning at-
tacks via meta-learning. ough these graph adversarial aacks are
eective, they focus on manipulating links among existing nodes
in a graph, which are impractical as these nodes/individuals are
not controlled by the aacker.
Our framework is inherently dierent from existing work. In-
stead of manipulating links among existing nodes, our framework
inject fake nodes to the graph (say fake accounts in Facebook), and
manipulate the label and links of fake nodes to poison the graph.
2.2 Reinforcement Learning in Graph
Reinforcement learning(RL) has achieved signicant successes in
solving challenging problems such as continuous robotics con-
trol [26] and playing atari games [24]. However, there has been
lile previous work exploring RL in graph mining domain. Graph
Convolutional Policy Network (GCPN) [34] is one of the works
which adopts RL in graph mining. e RL agent is trained on the
chemistry aware graph environment and learns to generate molec-
ular graph. [13] is another work which denes chemical molecular
reaction environment and trains the RL agent for predicting prod-
ucts of the chemical reaction. e most similar work to ours is
RL-S2V [12] which adopts RL for target evasion aack on graph by
manipulating the links among existing nodes; while we investigate
RL for non-target injection poisoning aack and manipulate labels
and links of fake nodes.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we formally dene the problem we target. We begin
by introducing the denition of semi-supervised node classication
as we aim to poison the graph for manipulating label classication
of graph classiers. Note that the proposed framework is a general
framework which can also be used to poison the graph for other
tasks. We leave other tasks as future work.
Denition 3.1. (Semi-Supervised Node Classication) Let G =
(V ,E,X ) be an aributed graph, where V = {v1, . . .vn } denotes
the node set, E ⊆ V ×V means the edge set and X represents the
nodes features. T = {vt1 , . . . ,vtn } is the labeled node set and
U = {vu1 , . . . ,vun } is the unlabeled node set with T ∪ U = V .
Semi-supervised node classication task aims at correctly labeling
the unlabeled nodes inU with the graph classier C.
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In semi-supervised node classication task, the graph classier
C(G) which learns the mappingV 7→ L˜ aims to correctly assign the
label to node vj ∈ U with aggregating the structure and feature
information. e classier C is parameterized by θ and we denote
the classier as Cθ . For simplicity of notations, we use Cθ (G)i as
the classier prediction on vi and Ti as the ground truth label of vi .
In the training process, we aim to learn the optimal classier C
with the corresponding parameter θL dened as following:
θL = arg min
θ
∑
vi ∈T
L(Ti ,Cθ (G)i ) (1)
where L is the loss function such as cross entropy. To aack
the classier, there are mainly two aacking seings including
poisoning/training-time aack and evasion/testing-time aack.
In poisoning aacks, the classier C uses the poisoned graph for
training while in evasion aack, adversarial examples are included
in testing samples aer C is trained on clean graph. In this paper,
we focus on non-targeted graph poisoning aack problem where
the aacker A poisons the graph before training time to reduce
the performance of graph classier C over unlabeled node setU.
Denition 3.2. (Graph Non-Targeted Poisoning Aack) Given
the aributed graph G = (V ,E,X ), the labeled node set T , the
unlabeled node set U and the graph classier C, the aacker A
aims to modify the graphG within a budget∆ to reduce the accuracy
of classier C onU.
As the aacking process is supposed to be unnoticeable, the
number of allowed modications of aackerA onG is constrained
by the budget ∆. Based on the problem, we propose the node
injection poisoning method to inject a set of adversarial nodes VA
into the node setV to perform graph non-targeted poisoning aack.
Denition 3.3. (Node Injection Poisoning Aack) Given the clean
graph G = (V ,E,X ), the aacker A injects the poisoning node set
VA with its adversarial features XA and labels TA into the clean
node set V . Aer injecting VA , the aack A creates adversarial
edges EA ⊆ VA ×VA ∪VA ×V to poisonG . G ′ = (V ′,E ′,X ′) is the
poisoned graph whereV ′ = V∪VA , E ′ = E∪EA ,X ′ = X⊕XA with
⊕ is append operator and T ′ is the labeled set with T ′ = T ∪ TA .
In the poisoning aack, the graph classier is trained on poisoned
graph G ′.
With the above denitions and notations, the objective function
for the non-targeted node injection poisoning aack is dened as:
max
EA,TA
∑
vj ∈U
1(Uj , CθL (G ′)j ) (2)
s .t . θL = arg min
θ
∑
vi ∈T′
L(T ′i ,Cθ (G ′)i ) (3)
|EA | ≤ ∆ (4)
HereUj represents the label of the unlabeled nodevj . If the aacker
has the ground truth for the unlabeled data (unlabel is to end-user
in this case), thenU is ground truth label; if aacker doesn’t have
the access to the ground true, thenU is predicted by graph classier
trained on clean graph. 1(s) is the indicator function with 1(s) = 1
if s is true and 0 otherwise. e aacker maximizes the prediction
error for the unlabeled nodes in U as in Eq. (2), subject to two
constraints. e constrain (3) enforces the classier is learned from
the poisoned graphG ′. and constrain (4) restricts the modications
of adversarial edges by the aacker in the budget ∆
In this paper, we use the Graph Convolution Network (GCN) [19]
as our graph classier C to illustrate our framework as it is widely
adopted graph neural model for node classication task. In the
convolutional layer of GCN, nodes rst aggregate information from
its neighbor nodes followed by the non-linear transformation such
as ReLU. e equation for a two-layer GCN is dened as:
f (A,X ) = somax( Aˆ ReLU (AˆXW (0))W (1)) (5)
where Aˆ = Dˆ− 12 A˜Dˆ− 12 denotes the normalized adjacency matrix,
A˜ = A + IN denotes adding the identity matrix IN to the adjacent
matrix A. Dˆ is the diagonal matrix with on-diagonal element as
Dˆii =
∑
j A˜i j . W (0) and W (1) are the weights of rst and second
layer of GCN, respectively. ReLU(0, a) = max(0,a) is adopted. e
loss function L in GCN is cross entropy.
4 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
To perform the non-target node injecting poisoning aack, we
propose to solve the optimization problem in Eq.(2) via deep re-
inforcement learning. Compared with directly optimizing the ad-
jacency matrix with traditional matrix optimization techniques,
the advantages of adopting deep reinforcement learning are two
folds: (i) Adding edges and changing labels of fake nodes are natu-
rally sequential decision making process. us, deep reinforcement
learning is a good t for the problem; (ii) e underlying struc-
tures of graphs are usually highly nonlinear [29], which adds the
non-linearity to the decision making process. e deep non-linear
neural networks of the Q network could beer capture the graph
non-linearity and learn the semantic meaning of the graph for
making beer decisions.
An illustration of the proposed framework is shown in Figure 2.
e key idea of our proposed framework is to train the deep rein-
forcement learning agent which could iteratively perform actions
to poison the graph. e actions includes adding adversarial edges
and modifying the labels of injected nodes. More specically, the
agent needs to rstly pick one node from injected nodes set VA
and select another node from poisoned node set V ′ to add the ad-
versarial edge, and modify the label of the injected nodes to aack
the classier C. We design reinforcement learning environment
and reward according to the optimization function to achieve this.
Next, we describe the details of the proposed method and present
the RL environment design, the deep Q
4.1 Attacking Environment
We model the proposed poisoning aack procedure as a Finite
Horizon Markov Decision Process (S,A, P ,R,γ ). e denition of
the MDP contains state space S , action set A, transition probability
P , reward R, discount factor γ .
4.1.1 State. e state st contains the intermediate poisoned
graph G ′t and labels information TAt of the injected nodes at the
time t . To capture the highly non-linear information and the non-
Euclidean structure of the poisoned graph G ′t , we embed G ′t as
e(G ′t ) with aggregating the graph structure information via de-
signed graph neural networks. e(TAt ) encodes the adversarial label
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Figure 2: An overview of the Proposed Framework NIPA for Node Injection Attack on Graphs
information LAt with neural networks. e details of the state
representation is described in following subsection.
Since in the injection poisoning environment, the node set V ′
remains identical thus the DRL agent performs poisoning actually
on the edge set E ′t .
4.1.2 Action. In the poisoning aack environment, the agent is
allowed to (1) add the adversarial edges within the injected nodes
VA or between the injected nodes and the clean nodes; (2) mod-
ify the adversarial labels of the injected nodes. However, directly
adding one adversarial edge has O(|VA |2 + |VA | ∗ |V |) possible
choices and modifying the adversarial label of one injected node
requires O(|L|) space where |L| is the number of label categories.
us, performing one action that contains both adding an adver-
sarial edge and changing the label of a node has search space as
O(|VA | ∗ |V ′ | ∗ |L|), which is extremely expensive especially in
large graphs. us, we adopt hierarchical action to decompose such
action and reduce the action space to enable ecient exploration
inspired by previous work [12].
As shown in Figure 2, in NIPA, the agent rst performs an ac-
tion a(1) to select one injected node from VA . e agent then
picks another node from the whole node set V ′ via action a(2).
e agent connects these two selected nodes to forge the adver-
sarial edge. Finally, the agent modies the label of the selected
fake node through action a3. By such hierarchical action a =
(a(1),a(2),a(3)), the action space is reduced fromO(|VA | ∗ |V ′ | ∗ |L|)
to O(|VA | + |V ′ | + |L|). With the hierarchy action a = (a(1), a(2),
a(3)), the trajectory of the proposed MDP is (s0,a(1)0 ,a
(2)
0 ,a
(3)
0 , r0,
s1, . . . , sT−1,a(1)T−1,a
(2)
T−1,a
(3)
T−1, rT−1, sT ).
4.1.3 Policy network. As both of previous work [12] and our
our preliminary experiments show that Q-learning works more
stable than other policy optimization methods such as Advantage
Actor Critic, we focus on modeling policy network with Q-learning.
Q-learning is an o-policy optimization which ts the Bellman
optimality equation as:
Q∗(st ,at ) = r (st ,at ) + γ max
a′t
Q∗(st+1,a′) (6)
e greedy policy to select the action at with respect to Q∗ is:
at = pi (st ) = arg max
a
Q∗(st ,a) (7)
As we explain in the above subsection that performing one poi-
soning action requires searching in O(|VA | ∗ |V ′ | ∗ |L|) space and
we perform hierarchical actions other than one action, we cannot
directly follow the policy network in Eq.(6) and Eq.(7). Here, we
adopt hierarchical Q function for the actions and we propose the
hierarchical framework which integrates three DQNs. e details
of the proposed DQNs are presented in following section.
4.1.4 Reward. As the RL agent is trained to enforce the misclas-
sication of the graph classier C, we need to design the reward
accordingly to guide the agent. e reasons why we need to de-
sign novel reward function other than using the widely adopted
binary sparse rewards are two folds: (1) as our trajectory in the
aacking environment is usually long, we need the intermediate
rewards which give feedback to the RL agent on how to improve its
performance on each state; (2) dierent from the target aack that
we know whether the aack on one targeted node is success or not,
we perform the non-target aack over graph thus accuracy is not
binary e reward of the current state and actions for the agent is
designed according to the poisoning objective function shown in
Eq. (2). For each state st , we dene the aack success rate At as:
At =
∑
vj ∈D
1(Dj , CθS (G ′t )j )/|V| (8)
θS = arg min
θ
∑
vi ∈T′
L(T ′i ,Cθ (G ′)i ) (9)
Here D is the validation set used to compute the reward. Note
that the CθS is not the graph classier C that evaluates the nal
classication accuracy. It represents the simulated graph classi-
er designed by aacker to acquire the state and actions reward.
However, directly using the success rate At as the reward would
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increase the instability of training process since the accuracy might
not dier a lot for two consecutive state. In this case, we design the
guiding binary reward rt to be one if the action at = (a(1)t ,a(2)t ,a(3)t )
could reduce the accuracy of aacker’s simulated graph classier
CθS , and to be negative one vice versa. e design the guiding
reward rt is dened as follows:
rt (st ,a(1)t ,a(2)t ,a(3)t ) =
{ 1; if At+1 > At
−1; otherwise. (10)
Our preliminary experimental results show that such guiding re-
ward is eective in our case.
4.1.5 Terminal. In the poisoning aacking problem, the number
of allowed adding adversarial edges is constrained by the budget ∆
for the unnoticeable consideration. So in the poisoning reinforce-
ment learning environment, once the agent adds T = ∆ edges, it
stops taking actions. In terminal state sT , the poisoned graph G ′
contains T more adversarial edges compared to the clean graph G.
4.2 State Representation
As mentioned above, the state st contains the poisoned graph G ′t
and injected nodes labels TAt at time t . To represent the non-
Euclidean structure of the poisoned graphG ′t with vector e(G ′t ), the
latent embedding e(vi ) of the each node vi in G ′t is rstly learned
by struct2vec [11] using the discriminative information. en the
state vector representation e(G ′t ) is obtained by aggregating the
embedding of nodes as:
e(G ′t ) =
∑
vi ∈V ′
e(vi )/|V ′ | (11)
To represent the label of the injected nodes, we use the two layer
neural networks to encode the TAt as e(TAt ). Note that for the
notation compact and consistency consideration, e(s) represents
embedding of the state, and e(va ) and e(Ta ) are the embeddings
of the node selected by action a and label selected by action a
respectively in the following paper.
4.3 Hierarchical Q Network
In Q learning process, given the state st and action at , the action-
value function Q(st ,at ) is supposed to give the scores of current
state and selected actions to guide the RL agent. However, as the ac-
tion a is decomposed into three hierarchical actions {a(1),a(2),a(3)}
for the eciency searching consideration, it would be hard to di-
rectly design the Q(st ,a(1)t ,a(2)t ,a(3)t ) and apply one policy network
to select hierarchical actions.
To overcome this problem, we adopt hierarchical deep Q net-
worksQ = {Q(1),Q(2),Q(3)} which integrates three DQNs to model
the Q values over the actions. Figure (2) illustrates the framework of
selection action at = {a(1)t ,a(2)t ,a(3)t )} at time t . e rst DQN Q(1)
guides the policy to select a node from injected node set VA ; based
on a(1)t , the second DQN Q(2) learns the policy to select a second
node from the node set V ′, which completes an edge injection by
connecting the two nodes. e third DQN Q(3) learns the policy to
modify the label of the rst selected injected node.
e agent rstly selects one node from the injected node set VA
and calculate the Q value based on the action-value function Q(1)
as:
Q(1)(st ,a(1)t ;θ (1)) =W (1)1 σ (W
(1)
2 [e(st ) ‖ e(va(1)t )]) (12)
where θ (1) = {W (1)1 ,W
(1)
2 } represents the trainable weights of the
rst DQN and ‖ is the concatenation operation. e action-value
function Q(1) estimates the Q value given the state and action. e
greedy policy to select the action a(1)t based on optimal action-value
function Q(1)∗ in eq.(12) is dened as follows:
a
(1)
t = pi (st ) = arg max
a∈VA
Q(1)(st ,a;θ (1)); (13)
With the rst action a(1)t selected, the agent picks the second
action a(2)t hierarchically based on Q(2) as:
Q(2)(st ,a(1)t ,a(2)t ;θ (2)) =W (2)1 σ (W
(2)
2 [e(st ) ‖ e(va(1)t ) ‖ e(va(2)t )])
(14)
where θ (2) = {W (2)1 ,W
(2)
2 } is the trainable weights. e action
value function Q(2) scores the state, and the action a(1)t and a
(2)
t .
e greedy policy to make the second action a(2)t with the optimal
Q(2)∗ in eq.(14) is dened as follows:
a
(2)
t = pi (st ,a(1)t ) = arg max
a∈V ′
Q(2)(st ,a(1)t ,a;θ (2)); (15)
Note that the agent only modies the label of the selected injected
nodea(1)t , the action-value function for the third action is not related
to the action a(2)t . e action-value function Q(3) is dened as
follows:
Q(3)(st ,a(1)t ,a(3)t ;θ (3)) =W (3)1 σ (W
(3)
2 [e(st ) ‖ e(va(1)t ) ‖ e(Ta(3)t )])
(16)
In Eq.(16), θ (3) = {W (3)1 ,W
(3)
2 } represents the trainable weights in
Q(3). e action value function Q(3) models the score of changing
the label of the injected node a(1)t . e greedy policy to such action
is dened as follows:
a
(3)
t = pi (st ,a(1)t ) = arg max
a∈LA
Q(3)(st ,a(1)t ,a;θ (3)); (17)
4.4 Training Algorithm
To train the proposed hierarchy DQNs Q = {Q(1),Q(2),Q(3)} and
the graph embedding method structure2vec, we use the experience
replay technique with memory buerM. e high level idea is
simulating the selection process to generate training data, which
are stored in memory buer, during the reinforcement learning
training process. During training, the experience (s,a, s ′) where
a = {a(1),a(2),a(3)} is drawn uniformly at random from the stored
memory buerM. e Q-learning loss function is similar to [24]
as:
E(s,a,s ′)∼M [(r + γ maxa′ Qˆ(s
′,a′ |θ−) −Q(s,a |θ ))2] (18)
where Qˆ represents target action-value function and its parameters
θ− are updated with θ every C steps. To improve the stability of the
algorithm, we clip the error term between −1 and +1. e agent
adopts ϵ-greedy policy that select a random action with probability
ϵ . e overall training framework is summarized in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: e training algorithm of framework NIPA
Input: clean graph G(V ,E,X ), labeled node set T , budget ∆,
number of injected nodes |VA |, training iteration K
Output: G ′(V ′,E ′,X ′) and LA
1 Initialize action-value function Q with random parameters θ ;
2 Set target function Qˆ with parameters θ− = θ ;
3 Initialize replay memory buerM;
4 Randomly assign Adversarial label LA ;
5 while episode ≤ K do
6 while t ≤ ∆ do
7 Select a(1)t based on Eq.(12);
8 Select a(2)t and a
(3)
t based on Eq.(14) and Eq.(14);
9 Compute rt according to Eq.(8) and Eq.(10);
10 Set st+1 = {st ,a(1)t ,a(2)t ,a(3)t };
11 EA ← EA ∪ (a(1)t ,a(2)t ), LAa(1)t ← a
(3)
t ;
12 Store {st ,a(1)t ,a(2)t ,a(3)t , rt , st+1} in memoryM;
13 Sample minibatch transition randomly fromM;
14 Update parameter according to Eq.(18);
15 Every C steps θ− = θ ;
16 end
17 end
In the proposed model, we use two layer multi-layer perceptrons
to implement all the trainable parameters θ in action-value func-
tions Q(1), Q(2), Q(3) and structure2vec. Actually, more complex
deep neural networks could replace the models outlined here. We
leave exploring feasible deep neural networks as a future direction.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we introduce the experiment seing including base-
line datasets and comparing poisoning aack methods. Moreover,
we conduct experiments and present results to answer the follow-
ing research questions: (RQ1) Can the NIPA eectively poison
the graph data via node injection? (RQ2) Whether the poisoned
graph remains the key statistics aer the poison aack? (RQ3)
How the proposed framework performances under dierent sce-
narios? Next, we rst introduce the experimental seings followed
by experimental results to answer the three questions.
5.1 Experiment Setup
5.1.1 Datasets. We conduct experiments on three widely used
benchmark datasets for node classication, which include CORA-
ML [7, 22], CITESEER [15] and DBLP [25]. Following [36], we only
consider the largest connected component (LCC) of each graph data.
e statistics for the datasets are summarized in Table 1. For each
dataset, we randomly split the nodes into (20%) labeled nodes for
training procedure and (80%) unlabeled nodes as test set to evaluate
the model. e labeled nodes are further equally split into training
and validation sets. We perform the random split ve times and
report averaged results.
5.1.2 Baseline Methods. ough there are several adversarial
aack algorithms on graphs such as Neack [35] and RL-S2v [12],
Table 1: Statistics of benchmark datasets
Datasets NLCC ELCC —L—
CITESEER 2,110 3,757 6
CORA-ML 2,810 7,981 7
PUBMED 19,717 44,324 3
most of them are developed for manipulating links among existing
nodes in graph, which cannot be easily modied in our aacking
seing for node injection aack. us, we don’t compare with
them. Since node injection aack on graphs is a novel task, there
are very few baselines we can compare with. We select following
four baselines, with two from classical graph generation models,
one by applying the technique of fast gradient aack and a variant
of NIPA.
• Random Aack: e aacker A rst adds adversarial edges be-
tween the injected nodes according to Erdos-Renyi model [14]
G(VA ,p), where the probability p = 2 |E ||V |2 is the average degree
of the clean graph G(V ,E) to make sure the density of the in-
jected graph GA is similar to the clean graph. e aacker then
randomly add adversarial edges connecting the injected graph
GA and clean graph G until the budget ∆ is used ups.
• Preferential aack [3]: e aacker A iteratively adds the ad-
versarial edges according to preferential aachment mechanism.
e probability of connecting the injected node vi ∈ VA to the
other node vj ∈ |V ∪ VA | is proportional to the node degrees.
e number of adversarial edges is constrained by the budget ∆.
• Fast Gradient Aack(FGA) [10]: Gradient based methods are
designed to aack the graph data by perturbing the gradients. In
FGA, the aacker A removes/adds the adversarial edges guided
by edge gradient.
• NIPA-w/o: is is a variant of the proposed framework NIPA
where we don’t optimize w.r.t the label of fake nodes, i.e., the
labels of the fake nodes are randomly assigned.
e Fast Gradient Aack(FGA) [10] is not directly applicable in
injection poisoning seing, since the injected nodes are isolated at
the beginning and would be ltered out by graph classier. Here we
modify the FGA for fair comparison. e FGA method is performed
on the graph poisoned by preferential aack. Aer calculating
the gradient ∇i jLGCN with vi ∈ VA and vj ∈ V ′, the aack A
adding/remove the adversarial edges between (vi ,vj ) according
to the largest positive/negative gradient. e aack only add and
remove one feasible adversarial edge are each iteration so that the
number of the adversarial edges is still constrained by budget ∆.
e aacker is allowed to perform 20*∆ times modications in total
suggested by [10].
5.2 Attack Performance Comparison
To answer RQ1, we evaluate how the node classication accuracy
degrades on the poisoned graph compared with the performance
on the clean graph. e larger decrease the performance is on the
poisoned graph, the more eective the aack is.
Node Classication on Clean Graph As the Neack [35] points
out that “poisoning aacks are in general harder and match beer
the transductive learning scenario”, we follow the same poison-
ing transductive seing in this paper. e parameters of GCN are
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Table 2: classication results aer attack
Dataset Methods r = 0.01 r = 0.02 r = 0.05 r = 0.10
Random 0.7582 ± 0.0082 0.7532 ± 0.0130 0.7447 ± 0.0033 0.7147 ± 0.0122
CITESEER Preferrential 0.7578 ± 0.0060 0.7232 ± 0.0679 0.7156 ± 0.0344 0.6814 ± 0.0131
FGA 0.7129 ± 0.0159 0.7117 ± 0.0052 0.7103 ± 0.0214 0.6688 ± 0.0075
NIPA-wo(ours) 0.7190 ± 0.0209 0.6914 ± 0.0227 0.6778 ± 0.0162 0.6301 ± 0.0182
NIPA (ours) 0.7010 ± 0.0123 0.6812 ± 0.0313 0.6626 ± 0.0276 0.6202 ± 0.0263
Random 0.8401 ± 0.0226 0.8356 ± 0.0078 0.8203 ± 0.0091 0.7564 ± 0.0192
CORA-ML Preferrential 0.8272 ± 0.0486 0.8380 ± 0.0086 0.8038 ± 0.0129 0.7738 ± 0.0151
FGA 0.8205 ± 0.0044 0.8146 ± 0.0041 0.7945 ± 0.0117 0.7623 ± 0.0079
NIPA-w/o (ours) 0.8042 ± 0.0190 0.7948 ± 0.0197 0.7631 ± 0.0412 0.7206 ± 0.0381
NIPA (ours) 0.7902 ± 0.0219 0.7842 ± 0.0193 0.7461 ± 0.0276 0.6981 ± 0.0314
Random 0.8491 ± 0.0030 0.8388 ± 0.0035 0.8145 ± 0.0076 0.7702 ± 0.0126
PUMBED Preferrential 0.8487 ± 0.0024 0.8445 ± 0.0035 0.8133 ± 0.0099 0.7621 ± 0.0096
FGA 0.8420 ± 0.0182 0.8312 ± 0.0148 0.8100 ± 0.0217 0.7549 ± 0.0091
NIPA-w/o(ours) 0.8412 ± 0.0301 0.8164 ± 0.0209 0.7714 ± 0.0195 0.7042 ± 0.0810
NIPA (ours) 0.8242 ± 0.0140 0.8096 ± 0.0155 0.7646 ± 0.0065 0.6901 ± 0.0203
trained according to Eq. (1). We report the averaged node classi-
cation accuracy over ve runs in Table. 3 to present the GCN node
classication accuracy on clean graph. Note that if the poisoning
nodes are injected with the budget ∆ = 0, such isolated nodes
would be ltered out by GCN and the classication results remain
the same as in Table. 3.
Table 3: Node classication results on clean graph
Dataset CITESEER CORA-ML Pubmed
Clean data 0.7730 ± 0.0059 0.8538 ± 0.0038 0.8555 ± 0.0010
Node Classication on Poisoned Graph
In poisoning aacking process, the aacking budget ∆ which
controls the number of added adversarial edges is one important
factor. On the one hand, if the budget is limited, eg., ∆ < |VA |, then
at least |VA | −∆ injected nodes are isolated. Clearly, isolated nodes
have no eect on the label prediction as they are not really injected
into the environment. On the other hand, if the budget is large,
the density of the injected graph is dierent from the clean graph
and such injected nodes might be detected by the defense methods.
Here, to make the poisoned graph has the similar density with
the clean graph and simulates the real world poisoning aacking
scenario, we set ∆ = r ∗ |V | ∗ deд(V ) where r is the injected nodes
ratio compared to the clean graph and deд(V ) is the average degree
of the clean graph G. e injected nodes number is |VA | = r ∗ |V |.
We will evaluate how eective the aack is when the injected
nodes can have dierent number of degrees in Section 5.4.1. To
have comprehensive comparisons of the methods, we vary r as
r = {0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.10}. We don’t set r > 0.10 since we believe
that too much injected nodes could be easily noticed in real-world
scenarios. For the same unnoticeable consideration, the feature
of the injected nodes is designed to be similar to that of the clean
node features. For each injected node, we calculate the mean of the
features as X¯ and apply the Gaussian noiseN(0, 1) on the averaged
features X¯ . e features of the injected node are similar to the
features in clean graph. We leave the generation of node features as
future work. As the other baselines method could not modies the
adversarial labels of the injected nodes, we also provide the variant
model NIPA-w/o which doesn’t manipulate the adversarial labels
for fair comparison. e adversarial labels are randomly generated
within |L| for the baseline methods. In both NIPA and NIPA-w/o,
we set the discount factor γ = 0.9 and the injected nodes VA are
only appear in training phase in all of the methods.
e averaged results with standard deviation for all methods are
reported in Table 2. From Table 3 and 2, we could observe that (1)
In all aacking methods, more injected nodes could beer reduce
the node classication accuracy, which satisfy our expectation. (2)
Compared with Random and Preferential aack, FGA is relatively
more eective in aacking the graph, though the performance gap
is marginal. is is because random aack and preferential aack
don’t learn information from the clean graph and just insert fake
nodes following predened rule. us, both of the methods are
not as eective as FGA which tries to inject nodes through a way
to decrease the performance. (3) e proposed framework outper-
forms the other methods. In particular, both FGA and NIPA are
optimization based approach while NIPA signicantly outperforms
FGA, which implies the eectiveness of the proposed framework
by designing hierarchical deep reinformcent learning to solve the
decision making optimization problem. (4) NIPA out performances
NIPA-w/o, which shows the necessity of optimizing w.r.t to labels
for node injection aack.
5.3 Key Statistics of the Poisoned Graphs
To answer RQ2, we analyze some key statistics of the poisoned
graphs, which helps us to understand the aacking behaviors. One
desired property of the poisoning graph is that the poisoned graph
has similar graph statistics to the clean graph. We use the same
graph statistics as that used in [8] to measure the poisoned graphs
for the three datasets. e results are reported in Table 4. It could
be concluded from the graph statistics that (1) Poisoned graph has
very similar graph distribution to the clean graph. For example, the
similar exponent of the power law distribution in graph indicates
that the poisoned graph and the clean graph shares the similar
distribution. (2) More injected nodes would make the poisoning
aack process noticeable. e results show that with the increase
of r , the poisoned graph becomes more and more diverse from the
origin graph. (3) e number of triangles increases, which shows
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Table 4: Statistics of the clean graph (r = 0.00) and the graphs poisoned by NIPA averaged over 5 runs.
Dataset r Gini Coecient Characteristic Path Length Distribution Entropy Power Law Exp. Triangle Count
0.00 0.3966 ± 0.0000 6.3110 ± 0.0000 0.9559 ± 0.0000 1.8853 ± 0.0000 1558.0 ± 0.0
0.01 0.4040 ± 0.0007 6.0576 ± 0.1616 0.9549 ± 0.0004 1.8684 ± 0.0016 1566.2 ± 7.4
CORA 0.02 0.4075 ± 0.0002 6.1847 ± 0.1085 0.9539 ± 0.0002 1.8646 ± 0.0006 1592.0 ± 17.4
0.05 0.4267 ± 0.0014 5.8165 ± 0.1018 0.9458 ± 0.0009 1.8429 ± 0.0027 1603.8 ± 12.8
0.10 0.4625 ± 0.0005 6.1397 ± 0.0080 0.9261 ± 0.0007 1.8399 ± 0.0017 1612.4 ± 22.2
0.00 0.4265 ± 0.0000 9.3105 ± 0.0000 0.9542 ± 0.0000 2.0584 ± 0.0000 1083.0 ± 0.0
0.01 0.4270 ± 0.0012 8.3825 ± 0.3554 0.9543 ± 0.0001 2.0296 ± 0.0024 1091.2 ± 6.6
CITESEER 0.02 0.4346 ± 0.0007 8.3988 ± 0.2485 0.9529 ± 0.0005 2.0161 ± 0.0007 1149.8 ± 32.4
0.05 0.4581 ± 0.0026 8.0907 ± 0.7710 0.9426 ± 0.0009 1.9869 ± 0.0073 1174.2 ± 42.8
0.10 0.4866 ± 0.0025 7.3692 ± 0.6818 0.9279 ± 0.0012 1.9407 ± 0.0088 1213.6 ± 61.8
0.00 0.6037 ± 0.0000 6.3369 ± 0.0000 0.9268 ± 0.0000 2.1759 ± 0.0000 12520.0 ± 0.0
0.01 0.6076 ± 0.0005 6.3303 ± 0.0065 0.9253 ± 0.0004 2.1562 ± 0.0013 12570.8 ± 29.2
PUBMED 0.02 0.6130 ± 0.0006 6.3184 ± 0.0046 0.9213 ± 0.0004 2.1417 ± 0.0009 13783.4 ± 101.8
0.05 0.6037 ± 0.0000 6.3371 ± 0.0007 0.9268 ± 0.0000 2.1759 ± 0.0001 14206.6 ± 152.8
0.10 0.6035 ± 0.0003 6.2417 ± 0.1911 0.9263 ± 0.0010 2.1686 ± 0.0141 14912.0 ± 306.8
that the aack not just simply connect fake nodes to other nodes,
but also connect in a way to form triangles so each connection
could aects more nodes.
5.4 Attack Eects Under Dierent Scenarios
In this subsection, we conduct experiments to answer RQ3, i.e.,
how eective the aack by NIPA is under dierent scenarios.
5.4.1 Average Degrees of Injected Nodes. As we discussed that
the budget ∆ = r ∗ |V | ∗ deg(vA ) is essential to the poisoning
aack, we investigate the node classication accuracy by varying
the average degree of injected nodes as deg(vA ) = {3, . . . 10}. e
experiment results when r = 0.1 and r = 0.2 on CITESEER and
CORA are shown in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b), respectively. From the
gures, we observe that as the increase of the average degree of the
injected nodes, the node classication accuracy decrease sharply,
which satises our expectation because the more links a fake node
can have, the more likely it can poison the graph.
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Figure 3: Node classication performance on (a) CITESEER
and (b) CORA by varying average node degree of injected
nodes
5.4.2 Sparsity of the Origin Graph. We further investigate how
the proposed framework works under dierent sparsity of the net-
work. Without loss of generality, we set average degree of injected
node as the average degree of the real node. To simulate the sparsity
of the network, we randomly remove Sp = {0, 10%, . . . , 90%} edges
from the original graph. e results with r = 0.01 and r = 0.02 on
CITSEER and CORA are shown in Fig.4. e results show that as
the graph becomes more spare, the proposed framework is more
eective in aacking the graph. is is because as the graph be-
comes more sparse, each node in the clean graph has less neighbors,
which makes the it easier for fake nodes to change the labels of
unlabeled nodes.
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Figure 4: Node classication performance on (a) CITESEER
and (b) CORA with varying graph sparsity
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study a novel problem of non-target graph poi-
soning aack via node injection. We propose NIPA a deep rein-
forcement learning based method to simulate the aack process
and manipulate the adversarial edges and labels for the injected
nodes. Specically, we design reward function and hierarchy DQNs
to beer communicate with the reinforcement learning environ-
ment and perform the poisoning aack. Experimental results on
node classication demonstrate the eectiveness of the proposed
framework for poisoning the graph. e poisoned graph has very
similar properties as the original clean graph such as gini coecient
and distribution entropy. Further experiments are conducted to
understand how the proposed framework works under dierent
scenarios such as very sparse graph.
ere are several interesting directions need further investiga-
tion. First, in this paper, we use mean values of node features as
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the feature of fake nodes. We would like to extend the proposed
model for simultaneously generate features of fake nodes. Second,
we would like to extend the proposed framework on more compli-
cated graph data such as heterogeneous information network and
dynamic network.
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